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GRUTTER AND THE PASSION OF JUSTICE THOMAS:
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR KEARNEY
Ronald Turner*
INTRODUCTION
In an April 1996 speech delivered at the University of Kansas School of Law,
Justice Clarence Thomas discussed his views on judging.' Declaring that judges are
"bound by the will of the people as expressed by the Constitution and federal
statutes,"2 Thomas stated that "[tihe popular idea that Justices and judges somehow
'make' the law, or represent the interests of certain constituencies (or help the
Constitution 'evolve') is a dangerous idea that is at war with the very concept of
impartial judging and the rule of law."3 Legal realism, Critical Legal Theory,
Critical Race Theory, Critical Feminist Theory - these and other "schools of
thought" posit, in Thomas's view, that "the law itself, is merely a product of the
person and, more importantly, the social structure and class that produced him or
her," such that "law becomes a means of oppression or of social control by the
political, cultural, and economic elite of which judges are a part."4
Rejecting the notion that judges are "not bound by anything at all save one's
own conscience," ' Justice Thomas told his audience that "judges must be
impartial referees who are willing at times to defend constitutional principles from
attempts by different groups, parties, or the people as a whole, to overwhelm them
in the name of expediency.",6 Accusing "the critical theorists and the political
* Alumnae College Professor of Law and George Butler Research Professor of Law, The
University of Houston Law Center, rturner@central.uh.edu; J.D. 1984, The University of
Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. magna cum laude 1980, Wilberforce University. The author
acknowledges and is thankful for the research support provided by Dean Nancy Rapoport
and the George Butler Research Fund, and thanks Meredith Duncan and Dorothy Brown for
their insightful comments and suggestions.
' This speech was subsequently published in the University of Kansas Law Review.
Justice Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (1996).
2 Id. at 2.
3 id.
4 Id. at 3.
5 Id. at2.
6 Id. at 4.
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interest groups [of] wish[ing] to destroy" the value of impartiality,7 Justice Thomas
said:
[I]mpartiality is the very essence of judging and of being a
judge. A judge does not look to his or her sex or racial, social,
or religious background when deciding a case. It is exactly these
factors that a judge must push to one side in order to render a
fair, reasoned judgment on the meaning of the law. In order to
be a judge, a person must attempt to exorcise himself or herself
of the passions, thoughts, and emotions that fill any frail human
being. He must become almost pure, in the way that fire purifies
metal, before he can decide a case. Otherwise, he is not a judge,
but a legislator, for whom it is entirely appropriate to consider
personal and group interests.8
In cases involving the Constitution, impartiality is obtained and maintained by
"seek[ing] the original understanding of the provision's text,"9 Thomas stated, as the
judge's analysis is tethered "to the understanding of those who drafted and ratified
the text."1 °
7 Id.
8 Id. (second emphasis added). Whether the desired and posited impartiality can be
achieved is questionable.
[T]his claim to impersonal and impartial authority, whether made in the
name of reason, knowledge, or law, is always false. It inevitably
depends upon the repression of the socially created character of
meaning in favor of a meaning imagined to be free from contingency
and the mere conventionality of language.
Gary Peller, The Metaphysics ofAmerican Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1151, 1269 (1985); see also
Samuel H. Pillsbury, Harlan, Holmes, and the Passions of Justice, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW
330 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999) ("Anglo-American legal culture has long held that law is
good to the extent that it comes from detached, principled - and dispassionate - decision
makers."); Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Impartial Judge: Detachment or Passion?, 45 DEPAUL
L. REv. 605,605 (1996) ("Pure impartiality is an ideal that can never be completely attained.
Judges, after all, are human beings who come to the bench with feelings, knowledge, and
beliefs.., about legal issues they must decide.").
9 Thomas, supra note 1, at 6.
Io ld. at 7. Thomas explained that looking to and being governed by the original
understanding helps judges to remain impartial:
[This approach] places the authority for creating legal rules in the
hands of the people and their representatives rather than in the hands
of the nonelected, unaccountable federal judiciary. Thus, the Consti-
tution means not what the Court says it means, but what the delegates
of the Philadelphia and of the state ratifying conventions understood it
to mean.... We as a nation adopted a written Constitution precisely
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Justice Thomas's views on - and call for - impartial judging, and ma
declaration that passion and emotion have no place in judicial decision making,
immediately came to mind as I read Professor Mary Kate Kearney's article, Justice
Thomas in Grutter v. Bollinger: Can Passion Play a Role in a Jurist's Reasoning?."
In this article, Keamey focuses on Justice Thomas's opinion in the United States
Supreme Court's recent and highly anticipated decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, 2
wherein Thomas disagreed with the Court's holding that the University of Michigan
Law School constitutionally considered the race of certain applicants when making
student admissions decisions. 3 Focusing on and embracing Thomas's opinion,
Kearney argues that Thomas, "the only black member of the Supreme Court... has
a unique vantage point on affirmative action,' 4 that his opinion "stripped away the
formalism that can distance judges.., from the reality of the situation at hand,"' 5
and that Thomas's views on and opposition to affirmative action are "infused by
[his] personal experiences"' 6 and an undefined notion of "passion." ''
Assuming arguendo that Professor Kearney correctly characterizes Justice
Thomas's opinion as an expression of his passion-driven and personalized opposi-
tion to affirmative action,"' this response agrees with Professor Kearney that passion
can play a role in a jurist's legal reasoning and conclusions. But should passion
play such a role, and to what extent? Justice Thomas has forcefully derided and
because it has a fixed meaning that does not change.
Id.
'L Mary Kate Kearney, Justice Thomas in Grutter v. Bollinger: Can Passion Play a Role
in a Jurist's Reasoning?, 78 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 15 (2004).
12 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
13 See discussion infra Part I.
14 Kearney, supra note 11, at 34.
" Id. at 35.
16 id.
17 Id. at 28. "Passion" can have several meanings and connotations. "Passion is intense,
fervent, ardent. But it is also overwhelming, irrational, out of control. And dangerous. Used
and defined this way, passion is the antithesis of the impartiality judges aspire to attain."
Shirley S. Abrahamson, Commentary on Jeffrey M. Shaman's The Impartial Judge: Detach-
ment or Passion?, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 633, 636 (1996) (emphasis added).
'8 See Derrick Bell, Diversity's Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1629 (2003)
(arguing that in his Grutter opinion, Thomas "expressed in passionate terms his opposition
to affirmative action"). All would not agree with this view. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, One
Man's Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2003, at A21:
In fact the opinion is a repudiation of the personal in favor of the
principles of justice as Justice Thomas understands them. He asks,
what does the equal protection clause forbid? The answer he finds is
that the clause forbids discrimination on the basis of race, whether that
discrimination is benign or malign in intention.
Id.
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decried judicial resort to and use of passion and emotion.1 9 Thus, and interestingly,
Keamey praises the (in her view) passionate Thomas for engaging in and committing
the very act of judicial partiality the Justice denounced in his 1996 speech. As I
argue herein, her article serves as an exemplar of what can occur when passionate
judicial work product is the subject of an admiring, but in important respects
uncritical, scholarly critique.
I. GRUTTER AND THE THOMAS OPINION
In Grutter v. Bollinger," the Supreme Court held that the University of Michigan
Law School's consideration of race as one factor in its student admissions decisions
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution.2 In an opinion joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and
Breyer, Justice O'Connor endorsed the diversity rationale set forth in Justice
Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.2 O'Connor
concluded "that student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify
the use of race in university admissions. ' 23 In her view, whether diversity was
essential to the law school's mission was a judgment lying "primarily within the
'9 See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
20 539 U.S. 306 (2003). For an examination of the Court's decision, see Bell, supra note
18; Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Grutter and Gratz: A Critical Analysis, 41 Hous. L. REV. 459
(2004); David Crump, The Narrow Tailoring Issue in the Affirmative Action Cases:
Reconsidering the Supreme Court's Approval in Gratz and Grutter of Race-Based Decision-
Making by Individualized Discretion, 56 FLA. L. REV. 483 (2004); Neal Devins, Explaining
Grutter v. Bollinger, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 347 (2003); Bryan K. Fair, Taking Educational
Caste Seriously: Why Grutter Will Help Very Little, 78 TuL. L. REV. 1843 (2004); Lani
Guinier, Comment, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our
Democratic Ideals, 117 HARv. L. REV. 113 (2003); Ronald Turner, The Too-Many-Minorities
and Racegoating Dynamics of the Anti-Affirmative-Action Position: From Bakke to Grutter
and Beyond, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 445 (2003).
21 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall.., deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
22 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In Bakke the Court held (1) that the University of California at
Davis medical school's reservation of sixteen out of one hundred seats in an entering class
for special admissions applicants unlawfully discriminated on the basis of race, and (2) that
race could be one of a number of factors considered in the admissions process. Justice
Powell's separate opinion provided the fifth and majority-creating vote for both holdings.
Writing only for himself in Part IV-D of his opinion, Powell opined that "the attainment of
a diverse student body ... clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of
higher education." Id. at 311-12. For an account of Powell's consideration and resolution of
the legal issues raised in Bakke, see JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.
455-501 (1994).
23 539 U.S. at 325.
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expertise of the university, '24 a judgment to which the Court deferred under a
presumption of "'good faith' on the part of a university. absent 'a showing to the
contrary."' 25 Focusing on "the educational benefits that diversity is designed to
produce," 26 O'Connor wrote that "[iun order to cultivate a set of leaders with
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path of leadership be
visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity. '27 In
seeking to enroll a "critical mass" of minority students, the law school sought to
assemble an "exceptionally academically qualified" and diverse class that would
yield "the educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce."28
Justice O'Connor determined, further, that the law school's admissions policy
was narrowly tailored as the policy considered race as a plus factor and did not
operate as a quota.2 9 Acknowledging that there was "some relationship between
numbers and achieving the benefits to be derived from a diverse student body, and
between numbers and providing a reasonable environment for those students
admitted,"3 she reasoned that "'[s]ome attention to numbers,' without more, does
not transform a flexible admissions system into a rigid quota."'" The admissions
files of all candidates were subjected to a "highly individualized, holistic review"
with "no mechanical, predetermined diversity 'bonuses' based on race or ethnicity."3 2
24 id. at 328.
2I ld. at 329 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318-19).
26 Id. at 330. O'Connor wrote that the "Law School's admissions policy promotes 'cross-
racial understanding,' helps to break down racial stereotypes, and 'enables [students] to
better understand persons of different races."' Id. "'Classroom discussion is livelier, more
spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting' when the students have 'the greatest
possible variety of backgrounds."' Id. Emphasizing the importance of education to the
preparation of students for work and citizenship, she opined that "the diffusion of knowledge
and opportunity through public institutions of higher education must be accessible to all
individuals regardless of race or ethnicity." Id. at 331.
27 Id. at 332.
2 Id. at 330. One analyst and critic of affirmative action argues that empirical evidence
supporting the "claim. . . that black students must be admitted in numbers sufficient to
provide a certain 'critical mass' on campus ... is neither asked nor given." THOMAS
SOWELL, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AROUND THE WORLD: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 142 (2004).
Sowell argues further that "a 'critical mass' is likely to be counterproductive academically"
where "an anti-intellectual black subculture reduces black students' performances well below
what they are capable of." Id. at 143 (citing JOHN H. MCWHORTER, LOSINGTHE RACE: SELF-
SABOTAGE IN BLACK AMERICA, at chs. 3, 4 (2000)).
29 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334-35.
30 Id. at 336 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 323).
31 Id.
32 Id. at 337. In Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), decided on the same day as
Grutter, the Court held that a University of Michigan undergraduate admissions program
automatically awarding one-fifth of the points necessary for admission to certain under-
represented minority applicants was not narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling interest
in educational diversity and was therefore unconstitutional.
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Moreover, diversity factors other than race were considered, and every applicant
could inform the school of the contribution his or her admission would make to
diversity.3 Nor did the policy unduly burden persons who were not members of the
favored racial or ethnic groups, O'Connor concluded. 4
Having found that the admissions program was constitutional, Justice O'Connor
cautioned (in what Professor Lani Guinier calls a "puzzling clause"35 ) that "all
governmental use of race must have a logical end point."36 This "durational require-
ment can be met by sunset provisions in race-conscious admissions policies and
periodic reviews to determine whether racial preferences are still necessary to
achieve student body diversity."37 In the Justice's words:
It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use
of race to further an interest in student body diversity in the
context of public higher education. Since that time, the number
of minority applicants with high grades and test scores has
indeed increased.... We expect that 25 years from now, the use
of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the
interest approved today.3"
In his partial concurrence and dissent,3 9 Justice Thomas began by quoting a
passage from a January 1865 speech by Frederick Douglass. 4  In that speech
Douglass stated, among other things, that "if the negro cannot stand on his own
legs, let him fall also. All I ask is, give him a chance to stand on his own legs! Let
" See 539 U.S. at 337. "Because the Law School considers 'all pertinent elements of
diversity,' it can (and does) select nonminority applicants who have greater potential to
enhance student body diversity over underrepresented minority applicants." Id. at 341.
3 See id.
3 See Guinier, supra note 20, at 118.
36 539 U.S. at 342.
" Id. For an examination of O'Connor's discussion of sunsetting affirmative action
provisions, see Vikram David Amar & Evan Caminker, Constitutional Sunsetting?: Justice
O'Connor's Closing Comments in Grutter, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 541 (2003).
38 539 U.S. at 343.
" Readers interested in a more extensive review of Thomas's opinion should see Turner,
supra note 20, at 480-87.
40 539 U.S. at 349-50 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This was
not the first time a Thomas opinion began with a reference to and quotation of Douglass. See
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,676 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also KEN
FosKETr, JUDGING THOMAS: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF CLARENCE THOMAS 6 (2004)
(observing that behind the desk in Thomas's Supreme Court chambers "hangs a large portrait
of Frederick Douglass, the escaped slave turned Republican abolitionist whose fiery
radicalism Thomas often quotes in his Supreme Court opinions").
[Vol. 13:795
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him alone!"' 4 1 "Like Douglass," Thomas wrote, "I believe blacks can achieve in
every avenue of American life without the meddling of university administrators."42
For Justice Thomas, "diversity... is more a fashionable catchphrase than it is
a useful term, especially when something as serious as racial discrimination is at
issue."43 In his view, the law school was only interested in "aesthetics," in "a certain
appearance, from the shape of the desks and tables in its classrooms to the color of
the students sitting at them."" Conceding that true meritocracy is not "the order of
the day at the Nation's universities,"" Thomas, "with... force and some anger,"
46
opined that affirmative action improperly results in the admission of undeserving
African Americans.47
[N]o modem law school can claim ignorance of the poor
performance of blacks, relatively speaking, on the Law School
Admission Test (LSAT). Nevertheless, law schools continue to
use the test and then attempt to "correct" for black under-
performance by using racial discrimination in admissions so as
to obtain their aesthetic student body.48
Thomas accused the law school of constructing "a faqade" in which "a class looks
right, even if it does not perform right. The Law School tantalizes unprepared
students with the promise of a University of Michigan degree and all of the
41 539 U.S. at 350 (quoting Frederick Douglass, What the Black Man Wants: An Address
Delivered in Boston, Massachusetts on 26 January 1865, in 4 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS
PAPERS 59, 68 (John W. Blasingame & John R. McKivigan eds., 1991)). See infra notes
71-75 and accompanying text for more on Thomas's use and selective quotation of this
speech.
42 539 U.S. at 350; see also id. at 378 ("It has been nearly 140 years since Frederick
Douglass asked the intellectual ancestors of the Law School to '[dbo nothing with us!' and
the Nation adopted the Fourteenth Amendment.").
41 Id. at 354 n.3.
Id. Thomas explained:
The Law School's argument, as facile as it is, can only be understood
in one way: Classroom aesthetics yields educational benefits, racially
discriminatory admissions policies are required to achieve the right
racial mix, and therefore the policies are required to achieve the
educational benefits. It is the educational benefits that are the end, or
allegedly compelling state interest, not "diversity."
Id. at 355.
45 Id. at 368.
' Fish, supra note 18.
41 539 U.S. at 371-73.
48 Id. at 369-70.
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opportunities that it offers. These overmatched students take the bait, only to find
that they cannot succeed in the cauldron of competition. 49
"Who can differentiate between those who belong and those who do not?"50
This was a critical question for Justice Thomas. He expressed his concern that
observers would not be able to distinguish between the "handful of blacks who
would be admitted in the absence of racial discrimination" and those African
Americans ("[t]he majority of blacks ... admitted to the Law School") who were
the beneficiaries of affirmative action.5 Thomas asserted that, under the law
school's policy, all blacks "are tarred as undeserving"52 and are stigmatized:
When blacks take positions in the highest places of government,
industry, or academia, it is an open question today whether their
skin color played a part in their advancement. The question
itself is the stigma - because either racial discrimination did
play a role, in which case the person may be deemed "otherwise
unqualified," or it did not, in which case asking the question
itself unfairly marks those blacks who would succeed without
discrimination. 3
49 Id. at 372. Thomas saw no evidence that Michigan's minority law graduates "have
received a qualitatively better legal education (or become better lawyers) than if they had
gone to a less 'elite' law school for which they were better prepared. And the aestheticists
will never address the real problems facing 'underrepresented minorities,' instead continuing
their social experiments on other people's children." Id. (footnote omitted).
50 Id. at 373.
51 Id.
52 Id.
"3 Id. In an article discussing the "blow to dignity and self-worth" delivered by the
"culture of victimology," Thomas wrote that "[w]hen the less fortunate do accomplish
something, they are often denied the sense of achievement which is so very important for
strengthening and empowering the human spirit." Justice Clarence Thomas, Victims and
Heroes in the "Benevolent State ", 19 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y. 671,679 (1996). "In a world
where the less fortunate are given special treatment and benefits . . . the so-called
beneficiaries of state-sponsored benevolence are denied the opportunity to derive any sense
of satisfaction from their hard work and self-help." Id.
Thomas has recognized that the stigmatization of affirmative action argument can go too
far:
Most significantly, there is the backlash against affinative action
by "angry white males." I do not question a person's belief that
affirmative action is unjust because it judges people based on their sex
or the color of their skin. But something far more insidious is afoot. For
some white men, preoccupation with oppression has become the
defining feature of their existence. They have fallen prey to the very
aspects of the modem ideology of victimology that they deplore.
Id. at 680.
[Vol. 13:795
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I have asked elsewhere whether, "[gliven his fear of stigma," Justice Thomas
possibly sees himself as one of those African Americans in "high places" who have
been stigmatized by affirmative action. 4 As Professor Mark Tushnet has noted,
"[o]ne would have to have a completely tin ear not to hear the reference to high
places in government as identifying Justice Thomas himself. . . . [Thomas] is
concerned that some people will regard him as unqualified for [the Court]. And not
without reason." 5 The Justice's concern about color-coded stigma is not new. A
beneficiary of Yale Law School's affirmative action program,5 6 "Thomas felt
stigmatized, and he blamed affirmative Action" when his efforts to obtain a position
with a law firm were not successful.5" One of Thomas's colleagues on the Court,
Justice Antonin Scalia, has commented on Thomas's view of affirmative action:
54 Turner, supra note 20, at 487 & n.200.
5 Mark Tushnet, Clarence Thomas's Black Nationalism, 47 How. L.J. 323, 338-39
(2004). Tushnet recalls a political science professor's statement that Thomas "'had a
relatively undistinguished career by Supreme Court standards' before his appointment." Id.
at 339 (quoting Mark A. Graber, Clarence Thomas and the Perils of Amateur History, in
REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 71 (Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003)).
Tushnet "note[s his] disagreement with this assessment of Justice Thomas's pre-Court
career." Id. at 339 n.91.
56 See FOSKETT, supra note 40, at 3 (explaining that Thomas "entered Yale Law School
as one of the first beneficiaries of an affirmative action program designed to right the wrongs
of racial discrimination"); id. at 120 (reporting Yale Law School's minority application
committee member's discussion of the development of admissions formula for, and
evaluation of, black applicants at time of Thomas's application); see also id. at 284
("Thomas ... believed he had been tagged with a 'badge of inferiority' when he was
admitted to Yale under the school's first official affirmative action policy."); SAMUEL A.
MARCOSSON, ORIGINAL SIN: CLARENCE THOMAS AND THE FAILURE OFTHE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSERVATIVES 28 (2002) (noting that Thomas benefitted from affirmative action "in being
admitted to Holy Cross College and Yale Law School"); Juan Williams, A Question of
Fairness, ATLANTIC ONLINE (Feb. 1987) (At Yale, Thomas "remembers feeling the 'monkey
was on my back' because classmates believed that he and the dozen or so other blacks in his
class were there to satisfy the school's social-policy goals, not because of their academic
qualifications."), at http://theatlantic.com/politics/race/thomas.htm.
" FOSKETT, supra note 40, at 134. According to an acquaintance of Thomas,
Clarence and I talked many times about the damage that affirmative
action was doing to our reputations .... The things that he and I
worked so hard for.., had been trashed, because of the perception in
the larger society - and even among too many black folk - that
whatever we have, we have because somebody gave us some break.
Id. at 134-35. See also Clarence Thomas, Commencement Address at Syracuse University
Collegeof Law (May 19, 1991), in 42 SYRACUSEL. REv. 815,817 (1991), in whichThomas
notes, "[b]y the time I graduated from law school in May of 1974, 1 had been rebuffed in my
efforts to obtain employment in major law firms in my home state of Georgia" and "I was
steeped in frustration."
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I think that's the thing [Thomas] hates most about affir-
mative action, that it takes away from the accomplishments of
those who can make it in any league . . . . You go out and
people say, Yeah, sure you did this, but who knows? You might
just be the "show black" or the "affirmative action black."58
In February 1987, journalist Juan Williams reported that, while celebrating
President Reagan's appointment of Thomas to a second term as the chair of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, then assistant attorney general for
civil rights Bradford Reynolds "raised his glass" and said, "It's a proud moment for
me to stand here.., because Clarence Thomas is the epitome of the right kind of
affirmative action working the right way."59 Williams wrote:
Clarence Thomas flinched. Some of his aides looked down
and shook their heads. After all Thomas had been through in
defense of the [Reagan] Administration position on civil rights,
Reynolds had implicitly dismissed him as an affirmative-
action hire. And, worse, Reynolds had thought it a compliment.
Thomas showed a look of cold hurt - a look of disgust. He
folded his arms across his chest and looked away from
Reynolds.... A few days later, when I asked about his reaction
to Reynolds's comment, Thomas waved his hand, as if swatting
away the memory. "I can't pay no attention to Brad," he said.'
II. PROFESSOR KEARNEY ON JUSTICE THOMAS
In her article, Professor Kearney notes that "Clarence Thomas, the lone African-
American member of the Court," did not sign Justice O'Connor's majority opinion
in Grutter.61 Providing a descriptive account of the various parts of Thomas's
opinion," she writes that the opinion's "opening grabbed the reader's attention when
Justice Thomas invoked the words of Frederick Douglass. 63 Having "led off with
the stirring rhetoric" of Douglass's address,64 "Justice Thomas immediately
introduced his personal beliefs into the opinion when he stated that he shared
58 FosKETT, supra note 40, at 284.
9 Williams, supra note 56.
6 id.
61 Kearney, supra note 11, at 17.
62 See id. at 18-26.
61 Id. at 18.
64 Id. at 32.
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Frederick Douglass's views about the ability of blacks to 'achieve in every avenue
of American life without the meddling of university administrators.' 6' This
invocation of Douglass, an iconic historical figure, and the placement of Douglass
on the anti-affirmative-action side of the debate, are indeed strong rhetorical
moves - after all, the argument goes, if Frederick Douglass was opposed to
affirmative action, the practice must be unconstitutional.'
Focusing on Justice Thomas's "perspective," Professor Kearney states that
"Thomas's dissent has received widespread attention and criticism," and provides
citations to four newspaper articles criticizing Thomas's "opposition to affirmative
action .... 67 She then points to the "tone and rhetoric" of Thomas's opinion and
the Justice's forceful criticism, "infused by personal experiences," of the Michigan
law school's affirmative action policy. 68 "Justice Thomas is certainly not the first
Justice to inject passion and a personal element into an opinion, 69 Kearney informs
65 Id. at 18 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349).
6 On the use of another iconic African-American figure in discussions of and debates
about racial matters, see Ronald Turner, The Dangers ofMisappropriation: Misusing Martin
Luther King, Jr. 's Legacy to Prove the Colorblind Thesis, 2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 101 (1996).
67 Kearney, supra note 11, at 26-27. According to Kearney, "[m]any of those critics
assume that [Thomas] has been the beneficiary of affirmative action policies, and they are
offended that he is opposing those very policies that they believe have led him to his current
position on the Supreme Court." Id. at 27 (footnote omitted). For two reasons, Kearney
argued, these criticisms are problematic:
First, they assume without proof that Justice Thomas's achievements
are related to the color of his skin and not to his abilities. Second, they
validate one of the concerns that he expressed in his opinion: that
affirmative action policies lead people to believe that minorities who
reach high levels cannot possibly be there on the basis of merit.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Fish, supra note 18 (rejecting the view of those who read
Thomas's "opinion as a personal expression of anger at having been the beneficiary of a
policy that retroactively casts a shadow over his achievements").
68 Kearney, supra note 11, at 27.
69 Id. at 27-28; see also id. at 33 (noting that in expressing his views on affirmative
action, Thomas "has only followed suit and done what other Supreme Court Justices have
done before him"). In support of this point, Kearney quotes William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason,
Passion, and "The Progress of the Law", 10 CADOZO L. REv. 3 (1988). In his lecture
honoring Justice Cardozo, Justice Brennan opined that "qualities other than reason" have a
role to "play in the judicial process." Id. at 9. Brennan discussed "the rubric of 'passion,' a
word... [that] is general and conveys much of what seems at first blush to be the very
enemy of reason." Id. Passion includes "the range of emotional and intuitive responses to a
given set of facts or arguments, responses which often speed into our consciousness far ahead
of the lumbering syllogisms of reason." Id. Passion and "the dialogue between head and heart
is precisely what was missing from the formalist conception of judging." Id. Of course,
Brennan stated, "[i]t is ... one thing for a judge to recognize the value that awareness of
passion may bring to reason, and quite another to give way altogether to impassioned
judgment." Id. at 11. "It is often the highest calling of a judge to resist the tug of such
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us, and "[i]t may be argued that the use of rhetoric, emotion, and life experiences is
more appropriate in a dissenting opinion. In that situation, a Justice may feel less
constrained by the conventions of appellate opinion writing and, therefore, freer to
express his own beliefs.
70
Comparing and contrasting Justice Thomas's Grutter opinion with Justice
Blackmun's dissenting and "emotional opinion"7' in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services,72 Professor Kearney contends that "Justice Thomas's
dissent in Grutter balanced reason and passion."73  Reiterating that Thomas's
opinion began with Douglass's "Let him alone!" address,74 Kearney correctly notes
that Thomas's quotation of the Douglass speech omits critical language and
passages.75 Consider the full quotation of that portion of the Douglass address
sentiments," Brennan concluded, noting Cardozo's admonition that a judge is not free to
pursue "his own ideal of beauty or of goodness" and "is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment,
to vague and unregulated benevolence." Id. (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE
OFTHE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1921)).
For more on emotion and reason in the law, and the argument that the dichotomy of
reason and emotion is misleading, see Richard A. Posner, Emotion Versus Emotionalism in
Law, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 309-29 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999).
70 Kearney, supra note 11, at 28-29 (footnote omitted).
" Id. at 29.
72 489 U.S. 189 (1989). DeShaney held that the state of Wisconsin had no duty under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect a young boy from his abusive
father after state social workers and officials received reports of possible abuse but did not
seek to remove the boy from the father's custody. Dissenting from the Court's holding and
judgment, and expressing his concern for "[p]oor Joshua!," id. at 213 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting), Justice Blackmun complained that "the Court itself retreats into a sterile
formalism which prevents it from recognizing either the facts of the case before it or the legal
norms that should apply to those facts," id. at 212. Arguing that "formalistic reasoning has
no place in the interpretation of the broad and stirring Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment," id., Blackmun wrote that he "would adopt a 'sympathetic' reading, one which
comports with dictates of fundamental justice and recognizes that compassion need not be
exiled from the province of judging," id. at 213 (citation omitted). For an excellent
discussion of DeShaney, see Laura Oren, The State's Failure to Protect Children and
Substantive Due Process: DeShaney in Context, 68 N.C. L. REv. 659 (1990).
73 Kearney, supra note 11, at 32.
74 Id.
71 Id. at 18 n.22. Kearney quotes a newspaper columnist's discussion of crucial language
from Douglass's speech omitted by Thomas. See DeWayne Wickham, Editorial, Thomas
Distorts Douglass' Speech, USA TODAY, June 30, 2003, available at http://www.usa-
today.com/news/opinion/editorials/2003-06-30-opcomx.htm (stating that an ellipsis in the
Thomas quotation replaced Douglass's original words "that put what Douglass said into
proper context"). Having noted this criticism, and apparently agreeing that the omitted
language altered the actual context of the speech, Kearney nonetheless calls attention to and
speaks positively of Thomas's use of Douglass's speech. Kearney, supra note 11, at 18.
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quoted in Thomas's opinion, with those passages of the speech not quoted by
Thomas set out in italics:
I think the American people are disposed to be generous rather
than just. I look over this country at the present time, and I see
Educational Societies, Sanitary Commissions, Freedmen's
Association, and the like - all very good; but in regard to the
colored people, there is always more that is benevolent, not pity,
not sympathy, but simply justice. The American people have
always been anxious to know what they shall do with us. Gen.
Banks was distressed with solicitude as to what he should do
with the negro. Everybody has asked the question, and they
learned to ask it early of the abolitionists: "What shall we do
with the negro?" I have had but one answer from the beginning.
Do nothing with us! Your doing with us has already played the
mischief with us. Do nothing with us! If the apples will not
remain on the tree of their own strength, if they are worm-eaten
at the core, if they are early ripe and disposed to fall, let them
fall! I am not for tying or fastening them on the tree in any way,
except by nature's plan, and if they will not stay there let them
fall. And if the negro cannot stand on his own legs, let him fall
also. All I ask is, give him a chance to stand on his own legs!
Let him alone! If you see him on his way to school, let him
alone, - don't disturb him! If you see him going to the dinner
table at a hotel, let him go! If you see him going to the ballot
box, let him alone! - don't disturb him! If you see him going
into a workshop, just let him alone, - your interference is doing
him positive injury.76
As can be seen, critical passages are omitted from the Douglass quotation set
forth in Justice Thomas's opinion. Douglass did not express any opposition to, or
indicate any problem with, the work of the Freedmen's Association and other
"religious, secular, and quasi-governmental agencies created during the Civil War
to meet the spiritual, intellectual, and medical needs of both freedmen and Union
soldiers."77 Douglass was concerned about and criticized Nathaniel Banks, a
76 Douglass, supra note 41, at 68.
7 Id. at 68 n. 12 (editors' note). Indeed, for Douglass, the Freedmen's Bureau represented
a "commitment by the government to attend to the interests of his people," and "[t]here was
no job, short of president or pope, that ... Douglass would have liked better" than serving
as the head of the Bureau. WILLAM S. McFEELY, FREDERICK DOUGLASS 241, 260 (1991).
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Louisiana general who forced freed slaves to work on plantations. And, while
Douglass did plead for others to leave blacks alone, it is clear from the full text and
context of the speech that his plea was directed not to some unnamed meddlers, but
rather to those who inflicted positive injury on blacks by interfering with them as
they sought to go to school or to work or vote or tried to dine at a hotel. Douglass,
speaking in 1865, was not expressing views that unquestionably support Justice
Thomas's opposition to some contemporary conception of affirmative action in
higher education. Thomas's invocation and channeling of Douglass only tells us
what the Justice thinks that "Douglass, a former slave and consummate realist,"
speaking one hundred and thirty-eight years before the Grutter decision, and not
having experienced a future containing the stubborn legacies of slavery and Jim
Crow and de jure and de facto racial discrimination and subordination,79 would say
today about the need for and the desirability of the specific type of affirmative action
at issue in Grutter.
Professor Kearney also states that Justice Thomas "employed the personal
pronoun 'I' and used scathing rhetoric to decry the effects of those policies on
students with lesser qualifications," and in "strong language ... challenged the
majority's position that affirmative action helps and does not hurt its recipients. 's
According to Kearney, this critique was "expanded and personalized" in the course
of the Justice's discussion of affirmative action's effects on African-American hiring
and workplace promotions.8' Leaving no doubt of her belief that Thomas's race and
passion were of import, she states:
Justice Thomas is the only black member of the Supreme
Court and therefore has a unique vantage point on affirmative
action. He is the most likely member of the Court to have had
78 Banks implemented "serfdom" and "a plan of forced labor for freedmen and women"
in Louisiana. JOHN STAUFFER, THE BLACK HEARTS OF MEN: RADICAL ABOLITIONISTS AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF RACE 277 (2002); see also e. christi cunningham, Identity Markets,
45 How. L.J. 491, 519 (2002); Gregory D. Stanford, Thomas Shamelessly Hijacks Language
of Cultural Icon, MLWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 29, 2003, at 4J.
'9 Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 1, 4 (2002); see also Wickham, supra note 75. Evidence of Douglass's racial realism
is found in his September 1865 statement retreating from the view that "colored people in
this country [should not] combine and act together as a separate class" and should abandon
"colored conventions, colored exhibitions, colored associations of all kinds." MCFEELY,
supra note 77, at 243. In light of what he called the "persistent determination of the present
Executive of the nation [President Andrew Johnson], and also the apparent determination of
the portion of the people to hold and treat us in a degraded relation," Douglass recognized
the need for race-conscious associations and initiatives. Id.
80 Kearney, supra note 11, at 32, 33.
81 Id. at 33.
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direct experience with racial discrimination. Those experiences
have informed and shaped his beliefs, and he gave voice to them
in Grutter. These subjective beliefs are not necessarily inaccu-
rate or wrong - instead, they enlightened his perspective. His
voice resonated powerfully because it is the product of deeply
held convictions. When he wrote passionately about the Law
School's affirmative action policy, he compelled the reader to
listen to that voice.82
Thus, for Professor Kearney, the Justice Thomas who authored the Grutter
opinion is not just a Supreme Court Justice, but an African-American Justice who
approached the question of the constitutionality of affirmative action from a
racialized, experiential, and passionate perspective. As Kearney does not detail the
exact nature and specifics of Thomas's personal experiences, and how and why
those experiences shaped and informed the Justice's anti-affirmative-action views
and subjective beliefs, 3 it is difficult to assess the accuracy of her contention.
Kearney further argues that Thomas "stripped away the formalism that can distance
judges, particularly Supreme Court justices, from the reality of the situation at
hand,"84 and "moved the language of judging from the detached to the personal and
the essence of judging from abstract legal discourse to a search for the truth. The
82 Id. at 34 (footnote omitted). On this view, Thomas is speaking in a voice of color.
"[T]he voice-of-color thesis holds that because of their different histories and experiences
with oppression, black, Indian, Asian, and Latino/a writers and thinkers may be able to
communicate to their white counterparts matters that the whites are unlikely to know."
RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 9
(2001); see also Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALEL.J. 2007 (1991).
A fair reading and implication of Kearney's contention that Thomas gave voice to his
experiences with racial discrimination is that Thomas possesses a "deeper understanding of
certain issues," DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra, at 82, than that possessed by those who are
not black and who have not experienced discrimination. Kearney thus places Thomas
squarely within a school of thought he has expressly rejected.
Interestingly, in another case, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), the Court held that
a Virginia law banning cross burning with the intent to intimidate did not violate the First
Amendment. Justice Thomas argued that the Court erred "in imputing an expressive
component to the activity in question." Id. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In a non-formalist
and Thomasian critical race theory moment, he stated: "In every culture, certain things
acquire meaning well beyond what outsiders can comprehend. That goes for both the sacred
and the profane. I believe that cross burning is the paradigmatic example of the latter." Id.
(citation omitted).
83 For a recent effort to explain the impact of Thomas's pre-Court life and experiences
on his judicial philosophy and civil rights jurisprudence, see Nathan W. Dean, The Primacy
of the Individual in the Political Philosophy and Civil Rights Jurisprudence of Justice
Clarence Thomas, 14 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 27 (2004).
84 Kearney, supra note 11, at 35.
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passion in Justice Thomas's opinion infused his reasoning with a power that is
difficult to ignore. '8 5 If Thomas's emotion and passion did in fact strip away
formalism, as Kearney suggests, he departed from a critical tenet of formalism; for
if asked whether a jurist should resort to or give in to emotion in deciding a case, a
formalist "would probably answer, 'Not at all.' 1'86
If Professor Keamey is correct, Justice Thomas's critique of race-conscious
affirmative action resonates and is made all the more powerful by the fact that
Thomas is a black man with a "unique vantage point on affirmative action. '7
Praising the Justice's approach, she approves of a judicial opinion and analysis of
law based on, and grounded in, the personal and the passionate, the biographical and
the biological. Rather than taking Thomas's arguments as they are and assessing
them without regard to the color of the Justice's skin,8 she assumes and runs the risk
of celebrating "not ... the quality of the argument but .. the skin color of the
arguer." 9
One wonders what Justice Thomas would make of such praise, for it is
manifestly contrary to and inconsistent with his pronouncements on the proper role
of the judge engaged in the interpretation and application of the Constitution. 90
Recall that in his 1996 Kansas speech, Thomas made it crystal clear that the
interpretive and applicative enterprise should be based on the original understanding
of the pertinent constitutional text and historical context, with the judge's personal
views playing no legitimate role in his or her decision.91 Thomas also spoke of the
way in which Court observers speculate about "how the personal backgrounds and
predispositions of the Justices influenced their votes."92 Moreover, identifying
impartiality as the essence of principled judging,93 Thomas declared that the judge
who looks to race or sex or other aspects of his or her background when deciding
a case, and who fails to "attempt to exorcise himself or herself of the passions,
thoughts, and emotions that fill any frail human being" is not a judge at all.9
Instead, he or she acts like a legislator who, unlike Thomas's ideal judge, may
85 Id.
86 Posner, supra note 69, at 321.
7 Kearney, supra note 11, at 34.
88 See Stephen L. Carter, Academic Tenure and "White Male" Standards: Some Lessons
from the Patent Law, 100 YALE L.J. 2065, 2065 (1991). Professor Carter recounts a
conversation with a professor who stated that knowing that Carter was black would have
helped her place an argument Carter had made in an article "in its proper perspective." Carter
asked "[w]hy... could she not simply take the argument as it was, evaluating it without
regard to the color of [his] skin?"
89 Id. at 2079.
0 See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
91 Id.
92 Thomas, supra note 1, at 2.
9' See id. at 4.
94 Id.
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legitimately be partial and may appropriately be influenced by, and act on, passion
and emotion.
To reiterate, if one agrees with Professor Kearney's characterization of, and
argument that, Justice Thomas's Grutter opinion is the product of Thomas's passion
and personal views on affirmative action, it must be asked whether his opinion can
be squared with - or is instead a departure from - the Justice's call for impartial
and dispassionate judging and principled adjudication.95 The importance of this
question is and should be obvious to those who believe that "passion is the antithesis
of the impartiality judges aspire to attain." 96 Given Thomas's position regarding the
judge's institutional and impartial role in construing the Constitution, his personal
views, no matter how strongly and passionately held and espoused, are not the point.
Furthermore, conspicuously absent from Justice Thomas's Grutter opinion is
an analysis of what, if anything, the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause thought or may have thought about the
constitutionality of voluntary race-conscious measures and initiatives enacted and
implemented by governmental entities.97 Did the framers and ratifiers of the
Fourteenth Amendment believe that race-conscious governmental programs did not
offend (their understanding of) equal protection principles?98 While consideration
of those subjects would not ineluctably lead to the conclusion that race-conscious
affirmative action is constitutional, the focus would be on that which Thomas says
matters - the text and history of the Fourteenth Amendment - and not the
Justice's subjective beliefs and personal views of the desirability and perceived
problems of affirmative action programs. Given Thomas's declaration that a judge's
impartial interpretation of the Constitution is and must be tethered "to the
" Elsewhere Justice Thomas has emphasized that "a judge must be disciplined when
making decisions. It takes time, intellect, intellectual honesty, and hard work to decide cases
properly and to get them right." Justice Clarence Thomas, Transition from Policymaker to
Judge - A Matter of Deference, 26 CREIGHTON L. REv. 241, 252-53 (1993).
96 Abrahamson, supra note 17, at 636.
9' For discussions of the existence of race-conscious governmental measures and
actions at the time of the framing and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, see
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., THE DYNAMIC CONsTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 125 (2004); Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427,
431-32 (1997); Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 754, 772-73 (1985); Turner, supra note 20, at
466-67 n.96.
98 See MARCOSSON, supra note 56, at 24 (answering this question in the affirmative); see
also Cass R. Sunstein, The Rehnquist Revolution, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 27, 2004, at 36.
Sunstein notes that "a great deal of historial work suggests that, as originally understood, no
provision of the Constitution bans affirmative action programs," and that Justice Thomas has
"repeatedly declared that the Constitution forbids such programs," but has "not so much as
bothered to investigate the original understanding." Id.
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understanding of those who drafted and ratified the text,"'99 one can fairly ask
whether Thomas's policy arguments made in opposition to affirmative action are
partial and untethered and, consequently, methodologically and analytically
unsound.
Again, if Keamey is correct that the persuasive power of Thomas's opinion is
generated and enhanced by the passion of this African-American Justice (her label
and categorization, not mine), one can easily and fairly conclude that the opinion
does not meet Thomas's declared standards of impartial, deracinated, dispassionate,
unemotional, and nonbiographical judging. Kearney thus praises Thomas for
engaging in the very same judicial (mis)conduct as the jurist who (in Thomas's
words) fails to "become almost pure, in the way that fire purifies metal, before he
can decide a case."' °
I am not and should not be understood as saying that Justice Thomas's views on
and opposition to affirmative action are not legitimate or that he should not express
them. Disagreement with or the questioning of one or the other side of the
affirmative action debate has been and will continue to be part of the legal, political
and social landscape, and differing conclusions have been and will continue to be
reached by judges, scholars, legislators, institutions, and citizens grappling with the
question of whether certain race-conscious affirmative action is constitutional. So
I agree with Professor Kearney that "[a] discussion of Justice Thomas's opinion...
should not focus on whether he has a right to express his own views on affirmative
action."'' 1 That he has that right is not questioned here. What can and should be
questioned, however, is the route taken by the Justice to his anti-affirmative-action
destination. Kearney's reading and characterization of Thomas's Grutter opinion
highlights and, perhaps ironically, raises fundamental questions about the Justice's
methodology as measured against, not Kearney's or this writer's preferred approach
or analysis, but Justice Thomas's own conception of the proper and dispassionate
role and function of the judge. As one commentator noted, "when it comes to the
Equal Protection Clause ... a voice speaks which Justice Thomas cannot ignore:
that of Clarence Thomas. '
10 2
CONCLUSION
One problem with employing and endorsing a completely or predominantly
passionate and emotional approach when considering a legal issue, for both the jurist
and the scholar, is that such an approach can shortcut rigorous inquiry and, as
concerns the scholar, deprive us of the benefits of the educative and revelatory
" Thomas, supra note 1, at 7.
'00 Id. at 4.
10 Kearney, supra note 11, at 33.
102 MARCOSSON, supra note 56, at 25.
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critique. Professor Kearney was obviously moved by Justice Thomas's personal and
passionate "search for the truth."'' 1 3 So moved, it is perhaps understandable that she
finds rhetorical power in the opinion. So moved, it is understandable that she is (and
others may be) ready to accept Thomas's challenge that the "focus [should be] on
the reality of affirmative action rather than its lofty and somewhat amorphous goals.
We should accept this challenge and, in doing so, decide whether these goals are
best advanced by policies such as the one in place at the University of Michigan
Law School.' 4 But, moved or not, and accepting for the sake of argument
Kearney's account of the passionate nature and basis of Thomas's opinion, we
should and must question whether a "fair, reasoned judgment on the meaning of the
law" has been reached by a jurist exorcised of the passions and emotions that,
according to Justice Thomas, separate the pure from the contaminated, the judge
from the legislator, personal preferences from the rule of law, and "Force and Will"
from "reason and judgment."' 0 5
103 Keamey, supra note 11, at 35.
104 Id.
105 Thomas, supra note 1, at 4.
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